從小我就耳濡目染我爸修理大小東西的技巧，從原子筆沒水換筆芯、換筆桿(而不是整枝丟掉)、桌子高低腳、日光燈管、馬桶裡的浮球、臉盆下水管、水塔等。家裡頂樓還有一片園藝，每當日曬雨淋或甚至只是日常澆水，滿地樹葉隨著水流流向水孔，不消說一下子水孔就阻塞了，我爸不知道從什麼時候發明了一項巧思，弄了一個平常像撈水餃般的鐵絲網篩子，半圓的篩子倒置蓋在水孔上，於是，樹葉被擋住了，積水則可以順利排除。另外，水塔也是個很奇妙的經驗，我又忘了為什麼要排水塔裡的水了，只見我爸拿了一根水管，一端連結水塔底部，巧妙排出水管裡的空氣之後，另一端接到另一個水箱(有時候只是裝了水的臉盆)，水竟然漸漸地從水塔流經水管排到水箱！對於水往低處流這道理再熟悉不過的我，看著水竟然從低處水管流往高處水箱嚇死了，那是我第一次體會虹吸(siphon)。這件事約莫發生在我國三到高一的時候，因為那時候剛好去參加師大物理營，大地遊戲不巧就被我遇上siphon的應用了，印象特別深刻。更小在我國小的時候有一次暑假作業是個物理實驗，大家都知道紙遇火會燃燒，但是若紙裡裝了水則是燃燒不起來的，雖然現在看起來一切都很合理，小時候可覺得像魔術般神奇，這也是我爸親自帶我做實驗的經驗。我還被阿媽稱讚過「這細漢就識『儉』(台語)」，害我沾沾自喜至今。我大致在這樣的氛圍下長大：節儉、獨立。
雖然我現在倒也崇尚享樂主義，害我不得不重新評估一番我所謂的節儉與獨立精神，不過如果有任何的話，我想我爸給我的影響是非常深刻的！當初決定念電機系，與其說是因為看清抑或盲從電機系是台灣顯學，不如說當初只想修修東西，讓機器「活」起來。其興奮的程度不亞於最近合成生物學創造的第一個人造細菌。最近恰巧幾件事，因此蘊釀了這篇文章。
第一件是陳小芭的webcam壞掉了，追根究抵就是USB連接線斷了。既然是幾條電線的問題，我勇敢地把多餘(但是是好的)USB線喀嚓剪斷換去接webcam，果不其然webcam又可以正常運作了！同時陳小芭寫信給Logitech的客服問到一條USB線也可以貴到10~20塊美金。
當然也不能只講成功的案例，我故技重施在筆電散熱板上時就失敗了，因此目前我猜即使是"Universal"SB接頭，接頭裡的構造可能還是不一樣。
第二件是吸塵器，沒清過吸塵器就不曉得裡面有多髒，尤其是吸地毯，上星期用的時候覺得怎麼跟平常用起來不順很多，於是手癢又把吸塵器拆開了，追根究抵，是裡面一條橡皮筋斷了，該條橡皮筋帶動滾輪，滾輪一邊帶動吸塵器讓使用者可以輕鬆向前推，另一邊掃進灰塵。由於是特製的橡皮筋，替代品目前還沒想到，不過當下解決方案就是用膠帶把橡皮斷掉的地方粘起來，湊合著用還真的成功了！
其實美國人自己也意識到自己很浪費，有種說法是公司為了刺激消費，就鼓勵汰換。這樣的假象讓美國境內境外生產了100項產品之後，消費者購買了30件，剩下70件以「新鮮、流行」之名全部丟掉。例如電腦裡只是CPU老了，但常常是換掉整台電腦。可是如果公司不製造這樣的假象，可能連30件的利潤也賺不到，因此即使明知效率很低，但總是賺到較多的錢了。離題了，寫這一點只是在突顯這問題反而更可以看清自己。
This is the gift from my dad. Thank you, daddy! Happy birthday!
2010年5月15日 星期六
2010年5月8日 星期六
THE DIFFICULT ART OF FINLANDIZATION
標籤：
好文章
第一次嘗試翻譯，原文連結有四頁，這差不多是第二頁的全文，不確定自己翻得對不對，將原文一起附上。不確定的地方我特別用紅字
THE DIFFICULT ART OF FINLANDIZATION
Bruce Gilley develops a "Finlandization" scenario for Chinese-Taiwanese relations in his article "Not So Dire Straits." Although my theory of Finlandization is applied and discussed in a fair and interesting way, Gilley paints an excessively rosy picture of the concept, and I do not share his view that Taiwan will eventually choose the Finlandization option by discreetly pushing the United States aside.
Bruce Gilley 在一月時演繹了一篇中台關係芬蘭化情節的文章"Not So Dire Straits"。雖然我的芬蘭化理論已被廣泛地應用與討論，Gilley仍對該觀念做了一個過度樂觀的描述。我並不同意其中他說，台灣最終將藉由疏離美國而選擇芬蘭化。
Finlandization, or adaptive acquiescence, is a relatively infrequent phenomenon in world politics, and for good reasons. It is a difficult model of politics for a weak state, and the odds are stacked against it: an unequal relationship with a neighboring great power that is often motivated by a different ideology does not bode well. The weak power must show realist resignation, essentially declaring, "We recognize that we are part of a great-power sphere of interest, and we abstain from borrowing military strength from any competing great power to revise this status quo. In return, we expect respect for our core values, so that we can preserve the traditional way of organizing our society." It also requires Bismarckian restraint on the part of the great power, which must resist the temptation to simply impose its own puppet regime -- which historically has been a much more common phenomenon than Finlandization.
芬蘭化，或說適應性的默許，在世界政治裡並不尋常，而且有很好的理由解釋為何不尋常。對弱國而言，它是一個困難的政治模式，形勢上也對弱國不利：與一個鄰近、但意識型態卻不同的強國建立不平等的關係並不是一件好事，弱國必須向現實妥協，基本上宣稱：「我們了解我們是強國利益範圍下的一部分，我們也放棄藉由第三強國武力的協助來改善現況。」做為回報，我們希望強國能尊重我們的核心價值，以致我們能保存傳統維繫社會的方式。弱國也需要以俾斯麥式的方式約束自己是強國的一部分：強國必須抵擋勉強和這個弱國傀儡在一起的誘惑。歷史上已經有比芬蘭化更多這樣的現象。
The devilish logic of Finlandization is that the concessions are often mutually committing. They create goodwill in the short run, but they also lead to raised expectations for the future, and the weak state often finds itself on the slippery slope of making further concessions. Of course, there are countermeasures that can be used to gain a foothold on this slope.
芬蘭化可怕的邏輯在於讓步或妥協是雙方互相承諾的。初期這種讓步能夠製造善意，但他們也導致對未來漸增的預期。弱國常常會發現他們之後的讓步將愈來愈難以應對。當然，也是有對策可以被用來穩固立足點。
First and foremost is maintaining an overarching commitment to the weak state's core values. For example, Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, in a 1960 luncheon speech to his guest, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, declared, "Even if the whole of the rest of Europe becomes communist, Finland will remain a traditional Scandinavian democracy." Statements like this must be repeated over and over again in order to be effective. Second, such statements must be given credibility, which depends on the presence of a civil society historically committed to democracy. Third, to sustain this credibility, Finlandization efforts should preferably be headed by a politician with nationalist credentials who cannot be suspected of selling out the state's core values. Fourth, Finlandization requires an elitist approach to foreign policy: only a small number of top politicians should be kept adequately informed and involved in major decisions. Finally, governments pursuing Finlandization cannot always afford the luxury of free and frank democratic debate, since that could rock the boat in relations with the bigger neighbor; the media may therefore have to act as "co-diplomats" by endorsing the government's policy line.
首先，也是最重要的，是維持住弱國所謂核心價值的全面性的承諾。例如在1960年，芬蘭總統Urho Kekkonen在一次餐宴中向他的坐客(包括蘇聯總理Nikita Khrushchev)發表演說，宣示：「即使歐洲其餘的國家全部成為共產主義，芬蘭Scandinavian式的民主將保持不變。」諸如此類的演說必須不斷地被重申才能保持有效。其次，要讓人民信賴這類的演說，而這取決於民間社會歷史上是否忠於民主。第三、維持這信賴需要一位具有國家主義色彩的政治人物來領導芬蘭化，因為這樣的人不能被懷疑有可能出賣國家的核心價值。第四、芬蘭化的外交方針要求精英政治：只有少數的高層知曉與參與重大的決定。最後，追求芬蘭化的政府無法開誠佈公地舉辦大型民主辯論，因為那可能讓和強國的關係觸礁；因此，媒體必須共同扮演圓滑的角色替政府的政策背書。
As Gilley illustrates, much good can come out of Finlandization under the right circumstances. From a regional perspective, stable peace is preferable to escalating tensions and arms races. For China, it would be a major security gain if Taiwan were no longer seen as a pistol in the back or a floating U.S. base. And the trade benefits for both sides could be legion.
如同Gilley所描繪的，在對的環境下，芬蘭化會帶來許多好處。從一個區域性的觀點，穩定的和平比不斷加劇的緊張關係和軍備競賽來得好多了。如果台灣不再是背後的一把槍或是美國的一個浮板，對中國的國土安全可是有重大的加分。雙邊的貿易利益也可能變得很大。
My main objection to Gilley's analysis is that unilateral dependency is not a desirable project for any small power. It may be necessary for a nation to make the best out of a difficult situation, but no small power today will voluntarily discard a reasonable alliance option and limit its room to maneuver in the way Finlandization requires. Taiwan is already pursuing a détente policy in line with West Germany's Ostpolitik -- which took place within NATO -- but that should not be mistaken for Finlandization.
對Gilley的分析，我主要反對的在於一廂情願對任何弱國都不是值得擁有的方案，對一個國家想要在困境中做得最好而言可能是必要的，但今天沒有任何小國會以一個芬蘭化所需要的方式，自願放棄一個合理的聯盟選項，也不會限制自己達成目標的空間。台灣已經在追求一個緩和的政策，這與西德的東方政策一致，即北大西洋公約組織裡各國同意如果有必要的話予以會員國軍事協助，但這個政策不應該被誤解成芬蘭化。
Finlandization may eventually come to the Taiwan Strait, but only if an overburdened United States decides to reduce its future role in Asia, creating a wholly new regional environment. Before doing so, decision-makers in Washington should consider the likelihood of three possible consequences: the worst-case scenario, in which former U.S. allies become puppets of Beijing; the best-case scenario, in which China achieves détente with its neighbors; and, finally, the possibility that U.S. allies will turn to the difficult art of Finlandization, with all of its virtues and vices. The vices should not be overlooked.
芬蘭化雖然可能最終發生在台灣海峽創造出一個全新的區域環境，但也只有在忙過頭的美國決定減少它自己未來在亞洲的角色時才會發生。在決定之前，華盛頓的決策者應該考慮下面這三種可能的結果的可能性：最糟的情況，前美國同盟成了北京的傀儡；最好的情況，北京順利緩和了它周邊國家的緊張關係；最後，美國的同盟國，帶著它所有好的與壞的一面走向芬蘭化複雜的技巧。那壞的一面那時候不應該被忽視。
THE DIFFICULT ART OF FINLANDIZATION
Bruce Gilley develops a "Finlandization" scenario for Chinese-Taiwanese relations in his article "Not So Dire Straits." Although my theory of Finlandization is applied and discussed in a fair and interesting way, Gilley paints an excessively rosy picture of the concept, and I do not share his view that Taiwan will eventually choose the Finlandization option by discreetly pushing the United States aside.
Bruce Gilley 在一月時演繹了一篇中台關係芬蘭化情節的文章"Not So Dire Straits"。雖然我的芬蘭化理論已被廣泛地應用與討論，Gilley仍對該觀念做了一個過度樂觀的描述。我並不同意其中他說，台灣最終將藉由疏離美國而選擇芬蘭化。
Finlandization, or adaptive acquiescence, is a relatively infrequent phenomenon in world politics, and for good reasons. It is a difficult model of politics for a weak state, and the odds are stacked against it: an unequal relationship with a neighboring great power that is often motivated by a different ideology does not bode well. The weak power must show realist resignation, essentially declaring, "We recognize that we are part of a great-power sphere of interest, and we abstain from borrowing military strength from any competing great power to revise this status quo. In return, we expect respect for our core values, so that we can preserve the traditional way of organizing our society." It also requires Bismarckian restraint on the part of the great power, which must resist the temptation to simply impose its own puppet regime -- which historically has been a much more common phenomenon than Finlandization.
芬蘭化，或說適應性的默許，在世界政治裡並不尋常，而且有很好的理由解釋為何不尋常。對弱國而言，它是一個困難的政治模式，形勢上也對弱國不利：與一個鄰近、但意識型態卻不同的強國建立不平等的關係並不是一件好事，弱國必須向現實妥協，基本上宣稱：「我們了解我們是強國利益範圍下的一部分，我們也放棄藉由第三強國武力的協助來改善現況。」做為回報，我們希望強國能尊重我們的核心價值，以致我們能保存傳統維繫社會的方式。弱國也需要以俾斯麥式的方式約束自己是強國的一部分：強國必須抵擋勉強和這個弱國傀儡在一起的誘惑。歷史上已經有比芬蘭化更多這樣的現象。
The devilish logic of Finlandization is that the concessions are often mutually committing. They create goodwill in the short run, but they also lead to raised expectations for the future, and the weak state often finds itself on the slippery slope of making further concessions. Of course, there are countermeasures that can be used to gain a foothold on this slope.
芬蘭化可怕的邏輯在於讓步或妥協是雙方互相承諾的。初期這種讓步能夠製造善意，但他們也導致對未來漸增的預期。弱國常常會發現他們之後的讓步將愈來愈難以應對。當然，也是有對策可以被用來穩固立足點。
First and foremost is maintaining an overarching commitment to the weak state's core values. For example, Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, in a 1960 luncheon speech to his guest, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, declared, "Even if the whole of the rest of Europe becomes communist, Finland will remain a traditional Scandinavian democracy." Statements like this must be repeated over and over again in order to be effective. Second, such statements must be given credibility, which depends on the presence of a civil society historically committed to democracy. Third, to sustain this credibility, Finlandization efforts should preferably be headed by a politician with nationalist credentials who cannot be suspected of selling out the state's core values. Fourth, Finlandization requires an elitist approach to foreign policy: only a small number of top politicians should be kept adequately informed and involved in major decisions. Finally, governments pursuing Finlandization cannot always afford the luxury of free and frank democratic debate, since that could rock the boat in relations with the bigger neighbor; the media may therefore have to act as "co-diplomats" by endorsing the government's policy line.
首先，也是最重要的，是維持住弱國所謂核心價值的全面性的承諾。例如在1960年，芬蘭總統Urho Kekkonen在一次餐宴中向他的坐客(包括蘇聯總理Nikita Khrushchev)發表演說，宣示：「即使歐洲其餘的國家全部成為共產主義，芬蘭Scandinavian式的民主將保持不變。」諸如此類的演說必須不斷地被重申才能保持有效。其次，要讓人民信賴這類的演說，而這取決於民間社會歷史上是否忠於民主。第三、維持這信賴需要一位具有國家主義色彩的政治人物來領導芬蘭化，因為這樣的人不能被懷疑有可能出賣國家的核心價值。第四、芬蘭化的外交方針要求精英政治：只有少數的高層知曉與參與重大的決定。最後，追求芬蘭化的政府無法開誠佈公地舉辦大型民主辯論，因為那可能讓和強國的關係觸礁；因此，媒體必須共同扮演圓滑的角色替政府的政策背書。
As Gilley illustrates, much good can come out of Finlandization under the right circumstances. From a regional perspective, stable peace is preferable to escalating tensions and arms races. For China, it would be a major security gain if Taiwan were no longer seen as a pistol in the back or a floating U.S. base. And the trade benefits for both sides could be legion.
如同Gilley所描繪的，在對的環境下，芬蘭化會帶來許多好處。從一個區域性的觀點，穩定的和平比不斷加劇的緊張關係和軍備競賽來得好多了。如果台灣不再是背後的一把槍或是美國的一個浮板，對中國的國土安全可是有重大的加分。雙邊的貿易利益也可能變得很大。
My main objection to Gilley's analysis is that unilateral dependency is not a desirable project for any small power. It may be necessary for a nation to make the best out of a difficult situation, but no small power today will voluntarily discard a reasonable alliance option and limit its room to maneuver in the way Finlandization requires. Taiwan is already pursuing a détente policy in line with West Germany's Ostpolitik -- which took place within NATO -- but that should not be mistaken for Finlandization.
對Gilley的分析，我主要反對的在於一廂情願對任何弱國都不是值得擁有的方案，對一個國家想要在困境中做得最好而言可能是必要的，但今天沒有任何小國會以一個芬蘭化所需要的方式，自願放棄一個合理的聯盟選項，也不會限制自己達成目標的空間。台灣已經在追求一個緩和的政策，這與西德的東方政策一致，即北大西洋公約組織裡各國同意如果有必要的話予以會員國軍事協助，但這個政策不應該被誤解成芬蘭化。
Finlandization may eventually come to the Taiwan Strait, but only if an overburdened United States decides to reduce its future role in Asia, creating a wholly new regional environment. Before doing so, decision-makers in Washington should consider the likelihood of three possible consequences: the worst-case scenario, in which former U.S. allies become puppets of Beijing; the best-case scenario, in which China achieves détente with its neighbors; and, finally, the possibility that U.S. allies will turn to the difficult art of Finlandization, with all of its virtues and vices. The vices should not be overlooked.
芬蘭化雖然可能最終發生在台灣海峽創造出一個全新的區域環境，但也只有在忙過頭的美國決定減少它自己未來在亞洲的角色時才會發生。在決定之前，華盛頓的決策者應該考慮下面這三種可能的結果的可能性：最糟的情況，前美國同盟成了北京的傀儡；最好的情況，北京順利緩和了它周邊國家的緊張關係；最後，美國的同盟國，帶著它所有好的與壞的一面走向芬蘭化複雜的技巧。那壞的一面那時候不應該被忽視。
2010年5月1日 星期六
100501 SBEC 26th
標籤：
美國之旅
從去年開始算算也參加了幾個大大小小的conference，跟photonic west比起來小型很多，不過素質普遍我覺得SBEC比較好。我還是很介意發音、咬字的正確，古人說誠意正心，發音這種可以練的東西正是展現誠意的地方。事前我和伙伴也花了兩星期準備slides，老師這時候對我們很好，讓我們專心準備SBEC的報告。兩星期前的rehearse，我和伙伴各只能講6分鐘，一星期前進步到18分鐘，報告前一天則改進了流暢度、邏輯性。老師幫忙很大，一張一張幫我們順slide，實在揪甘心。也許會覺得事情拖到兩星期前才準備實在太慢，但事情總是很多的。
這次的挑戰在於報告一個我非常不熟悉的題目。大致上可以這麼說，只要跟生物有關的，我實在掰不出什麼東西好講，老師在第一次rehearse (6分鐘那一次)之後，提供了很多材料讓我可以「延長」talk。為日後回憶用，這次演講的題目是GRIN-Lens-Based Laparoscopic Optical Coherence Tomography for Kidney Imaging. 內容是什麼不太重要，我覺得怎麼形成一個好的talk還是比較重要。上場講完之後我覺得有75分，建言絕對要加權一下，伙伴說聽得出我在緊張。well...講這麼陌生的題目我怎麼可能不緊張呢？我覺得我場控還不錯，這次也有做到eye contact，不過也有可能只是自我感覺良好…orz
倒是演講前的talks完全聽不進去，腦中一直rehearse待會兒要講的稿，到目前為止仍是如此，是日後該改進的地方。
之後也去聽了伙伴的演講，他也講得不錯，不過很難說我們不覺得我們都捏了把冷汗，因為到報告前一天都還在潤稿。總之，SBEC順利結束，老師也恭賀Congratulations！應該真的有75分吧…:p
這次的挑戰在於報告一個我非常不熟悉的題目。大致上可以這麼說，只要跟生物有關的，我實在掰不出什麼東西好講，老師在第一次rehearse (6分鐘那一次)之後，提供了很多材料讓我可以「延長」talk。為日後回憶用，這次演講的題目是GRIN-Lens-Based Laparoscopic Optical Coherence Tomography for Kidney Imaging. 內容是什麼不太重要，我覺得怎麼形成一個好的talk還是比較重要。上場講完之後我覺得有75分，建言絕對要加權一下，伙伴說聽得出我在緊張。well...講這麼陌生的題目我怎麼可能不緊張呢？我覺得我場控還不錯，這次也有做到eye contact，不過也有可能只是自我感覺良好…orz
倒是演講前的talks完全聽不進去，腦中一直rehearse待會兒要講的稿，到目前為止仍是如此，是日後該改進的地方。
之後也去聽了伙伴的演講，他也講得不錯，不過很難說我們不覺得我們都捏了把冷汗，因為到報告前一天都還在潤稿。總之，SBEC順利結束，老師也恭賀Congratulations！應該真的有75分吧…:p
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