THE DIFFICULT ART OF FINLANDIZATION

第一次嘗試翻譯，原文連結有四頁，這差不多是第二頁的全文，不確定自己翻得對不對，將原文一起附上。不確定的地方我特別用紅字

THE DIFFICULT ART OF FINLANDIZATION

Bruce Gilley develops a "Finlandization" scenario for Chinese-Taiwanese relations in his article "Not So Dire Straits." Although my theory of Finlandization is applied and discussed in a fair and interesting way, Gilley paints an excessively rosy picture of the concept, and I do not share his view that Taiwan will eventually choose the Finlandization option by discreetly pushing the United States aside.
Bruce Gilley 在一月時演繹了一篇中台關係芬蘭化情節的文章"Not So Dire Straits"。雖然我的芬蘭化理論已被廣泛地應用與討論，Gilley仍對該觀念做了一個過度樂觀的描述。我並不同意其中他說，台灣最終將藉由疏離美國而選擇芬蘭化。

Finlandization, or adaptive acquiescence, is a relatively infrequent phenomenon in world politics, and for good reasons. It is a difficult model of politics for a weak state, and the odds are stacked against it: an unequal relationship with a neighboring great power that is often motivated by a different ideology does not bode well. The weak power must show realist resignation, essentially declaring, "We recognize that we are part of a great-power sphere of interest, and we abstain from borrowing military strength from any competing great power to revise this status quo. In return, we expect respect for our core values, so that we can preserve the traditional way of organizing our society." It also requires Bismarckian restraint on the part of the great power, which must resist the temptation to simply impose its own puppet regime -- which historically has been a much more common phenomenon than Finlandization.
芬蘭化，或說適應性的默許，在世界政治裡並不尋常，而且有很好的理由解釋為何不尋常。對弱國而言，它是一個困難的政治模式，形勢上也對弱國不利：與一個鄰近、但意識型態卻不同的強國建立不平等的關係並不是一件好事，弱國必須向現實妥協，基本上宣稱：「我們了解我們是強國利益範圍下的一部分，我們也放棄藉由第三強國武力的協助來改善現況。」做為回報，我們希望強國能尊重我們的核心價值，以致我們能保存傳統維繫社會的方式。弱國也需要以俾斯麥式的方式約束自己是強國的一部分：強國必須抵擋勉強和這個弱國傀儡在一起的誘惑。歷史上已經有比芬蘭化更多這樣的現象。

The devilish logic of Finlandization is that the concessions are often mutually committing. They create goodwill in the short run, but they also lead to raised expectations for the future, and the weak state often finds itself on the slippery slope of making further concessions. Of course, there are countermeasures that can be used to gain a foothold on this slope.
芬蘭化可怕的邏輯在於讓步或妥協是雙方互相承諾的。初期這種讓步能夠製造善意，但他們也導致對未來漸增的預期。弱國常常會發現他們之後的讓步將愈來愈難以應對。當然，也是有對策可以被用來穩固立足點。

First and foremost is maintaining an overarching commitment to the weak state's core values. For example, Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, in a 1960 luncheon speech to his guest, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, declared, "Even if the whole of the rest of Europe becomes communist, Finland will remain a traditional Scandinavian democracy." Statements like this must be repeated over and over again in order to be effective. Second, such statements must be given credibility, which depends on the presence of a civil society historically committed to democracy. Third, to sustain this credibility, Finlandization efforts should preferably be headed by a politician with nationalist credentials who cannot be suspected of selling out the state's core values. Fourth, Finlandization requires an elitist approach to foreign policy: only a small number of top politicians should be kept adequately informed and involved in major decisions. Finally, governments pursuing Finlandization cannot always afford the luxury of free and frank democratic debate, since that could rock the boat in relations with the bigger neighbor; the media may therefore have to act as "co-diplomats" by endorsing the government's policy line.
首先，也是最重要的，是維持住弱國所謂核心價值的全面性的承諾。例如在1960年，芬蘭總統Urho Kekkonen在一次餐宴中向他的坐客(包括蘇聯總理Nikita Khrushchev)發表演說，宣示：「即使歐洲其餘的國家全部成為共產主義，芬蘭Scandinavian式的民主將保持不變。」諸如此類的演說必須不斷地被重申才能保持有效。其次，要讓人民信賴這類的演說，而這取決於民間社會歷史上是否忠於民主。第三、維持這信賴需要一位具有國家主義色彩的政治人物來領導芬蘭化，因為這樣的人不能被懷疑有可能出賣國家的核心價值。第四、芬蘭化的外交方針要求精英政治：只有少數的高層知曉與參與重大的決定。最後，追求芬蘭化的政府無法開誠佈公地舉辦大型民主辯論，因為那可能讓和強國的關係觸礁；因此，媒體必須共同扮演圓滑的角色替政府的政策背書。

As Gilley illustrates, much good can come out of Finlandization under the right circumstances. From a regional perspective, stable peace is preferable to escalating tensions and arms races. For China, it would be a major security gain if Taiwan were no longer seen as a pistol in the back or a floating U.S. base. And the trade benefits for both sides could be legion.
如同Gilley所描繪的，在對的環境下，芬蘭化會帶來許多好處。從一個區域性的觀點，穩定的和平比不斷加劇的緊張關係和軍備競賽來得好多了。如果台灣不再是背後的一把槍或是美國的一個浮板，對中國的國土安全可是有重大的加分。雙邊的貿易利益也可能變得很大。

My main objection to Gilley's analysis is that unilateral dependency is not a desirable project for any small power. It may be necessary for a nation to make the best out of a difficult situation, but no small power today will voluntarily discard a reasonable alliance option and limit its room to maneuver in the way Finlandization requires. Taiwan is already pursuing a détente policy in line with West Germany's Ostpolitik -- which took place within NATO -- but that should not be mistaken for Finlandization.
對Gilley的分析，我主要反對的在於一廂情願對任何弱國都不是值得擁有的方案，對一個國家想要在困境中做得最好而言可能是必要的，但今天沒有任何小國會以一個芬蘭化所需要的方式，自願放棄一個合理的聯盟選項，也不會限制自己達成目標的空間。台灣已經在追求一個緩和的政策，這與西德的東方政策一致，即北大西洋公約組織裡各國同意如果有必要的話予以會員國軍事協助，但這個政策不應該被誤解成芬蘭化。

Finlandization may eventually come to the Taiwan Strait, but only if an overburdened United States decides to reduce its future role in Asia, creating a wholly new regional environment. Before doing so, decision-makers in Washington should consider the likelihood of three possible consequences: the worst-case scenario, in which former U.S. allies become puppets of Beijing; the best-case scenario, in which China achieves détente with its neighbors; and, finally, the possibility that U.S. allies will turn to the difficult art of Finlandization, with all of its virtues and vices. The vices should not be overlooked.
芬蘭化雖然可能最終發生在台灣海峽創造出一個全新的區域環境，但也只有在忙過頭的美國決定減少它自己未來在亞洲的角色時才會發生。在決定之前，華盛頓的決策者應該考慮下面這三種可能的結果的可能性：最糟的情況，前美國同盟成了北京的傀儡；最好的情況，北京順利緩和了它周邊國家的緊張關係；最後，美國的同盟國，帶著它所有好的與壞的一面走向芬蘭化複雜的技巧。那壞的一面那時候不應該被忽視。